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Neuroscience (or brain science) forms a constantly evolving field of the life sciences that 
often claims to possess the most innovative tools for uncovering the yet unknown mysteries 
of the human mind and especially of the emotions. Brain scientists have also emerged as 
fashionable popularizers of their field, and thus scientists of the affective neurosciences are 
generating a distinct discourse on emotions, which may be changing the way we understand 
them. Today the social neurosciences make a strong claim that human brains are malleable, 
or plastic. This notion has already had repercussions for the theoretical insights of the history 
of emotions that emphasize the interconnectedness of embodied emotional experience, the 
senses and culture.1 
Feelings are indeed interesting for brain scientists as they seem to connect the non-
conscious and cognitive, or the biological and cultural, capacities of the human mind. This is 
where neurosciences differ from cognitive sciences, for instance. For a long time, cognitive 
scientists dismissed emotions as non-cognitive and uninteresting phenomena. But for the past 
twenty-plus years, they have sought to translate them as intellectual and intentional 
‘thoughts’. This resembles the way the discipline of the history of emotions has usually 
understood the changing emotional rhetoric and expression in the past. It has been most 
convenient for historians to look at emotions as cultural and socially constructed artefacts 
and, indeed, ‘thoughts’.2 Interestingly, a number of neuroscientists have also concluded that 
the separation between emotion and cognition is artificial from the perspective of science – 
human thought is emotional activity, and emotions are thoughtful.3 As it is, during the past 
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decade and especially the past few years, a rapid biocultural shift has begun in the history of 
emotions.4 The dualities between nature and culture, or the conscious and unconscious, have 
been forcefully demolished. Simply stated, this means there is no nature-nurture dichotomy, 
but always both. The dyad has in fact lost its conceptual meaningfulness.5 Emotions are 
social constructs, yet they are not.6 The rapidly changing neurosciences may lack a grand 
theory, but the keywords are now neuroplasticity and social brain science. This engages 
neurosciences with the history of emotions. As Rob Boddice has put it, it may be possible to 
address the recent developments in the field as the ‘neuro turn’.7 
However, there seem to be persistent epistemological differences between the human 
and life sciences in addressing emotions. Yet, for all the seeming differences, one is able to 
find common ground. Both disciplines promote the view that emotions serve partly cognitive 
and goal-driven functions and are thus susceptible to change. Brain sciences and related fields 
have worked towards eradicating the Cartesian dualism between the body and the mind, and 
the human sciences have also all but dismantled the persistent divide between rational reason 
and irrational feeling, which in itself has been a Western, culturally shaped concept. Cultural 
studies treats emotions, or ‘affects’, as embodied cultural phenomena, which in turn may not 
be that far away from the interplay between the adaptive body/brain and the changing 
environment supposed by the neurosciences.  
Historians of emotions have until very recently been rather reluctant to integrate 
neuroscientific views into their discipline, and critical of attempts to do so, often for valid 
reasons reflecting the academic distance between history and the presentist, rapidly evolving 
brain sciences. However, advances in the brain sciences have already been taken into 
consideration by the social sciences. In this light, tentative steps towards dialogue among 
different disciplines have been implemented in the new field of critical and/or social 
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neurosciences. This dialogue aims at bringing the cultural and the social back into research 
on the human brain, thus potentially offering fertile ground for interdisciplinary approaches.8  
The most fundamental division between the history of emotions and the neurosciences 
seems to concern language. Historians of emotions study emotional concepts and 
representations of emotional experiences expressed in a textual, verbal and visual, yet 
linguistically communicated, mode. For neuroscientists, the emotions refer to an entirely 
different mode of communication, measured by brain scans and conceptualized not as 
expressions or representations of emotions but as bodily functions. These differing 
perspectives on emotions may be seen in the context of the classic division between the ‘two 
cultures’, those of humanities and sciences, perpetuated in higher education at least since the 
early twentieth century.9 Today these two academic and emotional cultures increasingly call 
for dialogue that would dissolve the nature-culture binary. 
 
Towards dialogue between the history of emotions and the neurosciences 
One of the reasons for the urgent need for dialogue has been, undoubtedly, the pinnacle status 
of the neurosciences within academe and in the wider society. As sociologist Nikolas Rose 
and Joelle M. Abi-Rached have demonstrated, the brain has frequently been equated with the 
mind, not only within academe but in popular presentations as well. The one who understands 
the brain has taken the front seat in explaining the human mind. For obvious reasons, there 
might be epistemological problems with this view, but more to the point, this view may pose 
biopolitical problems. This is the case when neuroscientists have been consulted as experts in 
criminal trials and in social policy initiatives, which are traditionally the fields of 
criminologists and social policy experts. However, a critical stance towards the social 
implementation of brain science does not mean its dismissal; rather, such a stance requires an 
understanding of how society, the human body/brain and cultural meanings are embedded 
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and constantly influence and rework one another.10 The Cartesian perspective placed the life 
sciences squarely within the universal sphere, whereas the human sciences have explored a 
socially constructed culture. This clear-cut division has not been viable for a rather long time. 
Culture and biology cannot be separated in human consciousness.  
Considerably more difficult than making this theoretical statement is, obviously, 
implementing it methodologically. As stated, historians of emotions have recently been 
alerted to integrating ‘biology’ into their field. The initial difficulties of this integration were 
demonstrated, for instance, by the methodological volume on emotions history edited by 
Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns, entitled Doing Emotions History (2014). The historian of 
religion John Corrigan stated in the volume that the challenge to understanding the emotions 
posed by the powerful life sciences, or ‘biology’ – what many of the authors call the natural 
sciences – should, one way or another, be taken into consideration in the history of emotions. 
‘Biology can and should be integrated into that enterprise [emotions history], though how and 
to what extent that will permit an integrated interpretation is still an open question,’ Corrigan 
wrote.11 However, in the short afterword of Doing Emotions History, Matt and Stearns 
confidently wrote that the ‘steady development of research in neuroscience cries out for an 
imaginative combination with history’. Acknowledging the methodological difficulties in 
combining the two, the writers nevertheless expected more innovative research in the near 
future.12 Indeed, in the few years since their call for innovative research, a steady theoretical 
development has gone through the history of emotions. In particular, Boddice’s recent 
theoretical treatise on the history of emotions fully embraces a biocultural approach to past 
feelings. For Boddice, the social neurosciences offer the most fruitful present companion to 
the analysis of ever-changing feeling.13 
For a long time, the difficulty of merging neurosciences and history arose from the 
rather old-fashioned perspective on biology as representing deterministic genes, or biologism. 
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Admittedly, many of the (evolutionary) biologists see emotions primarily as hardwired and 
genetically programmed constants, a view that many evolutionary psychologists share. 
Tentative enterprises in combining evolutionary psychology with historical research may 
have resulted in rather clear-cut divisions between universal and deterministic basic 
emotions, on the one hand, and the less important cultural changes and nuances, on the other 
hand. It is difficult to see a common ground in this enterprise, although few historians are 
willing to deny basic evolutionary assumptions. The problem is that evolutionary psychology 
is not interested in historical change per se but in evolutionary history, and thus emotions 
remain merely biologically constituted reactions to events, not the varied actions supposed by 
the history of emotions. 
The deterministic perspective relying on the assumption of basic emotions is not, 
however, shared by a growing number of neuroscientists and many other practitioners of the 
life sciences. I am not a trained brain scientist and therefore am not capable of dwelling on 
the intricacies of the discipline in detail. But suffice it to say that today’s mainstream 
neuroscience has come a long way from seeing humans as programmed or hardwired 
‘walking brains’. Thus, it is interesting to observe that at the same time as understanding the 
brain has been equated with understanding the mind, the brain sciences themselves have 
become more open to social and cultural approaches. To paraphrase Rose and Abi-Rached, 
today’s brain sciences now see humans once again as people who have brains. The brain 
shapes the person, while the person shapes the brain. Brains have suddenly become social.14 
The traits of the brain that emphasize both its plasticity and its social dimension have 
indeed perhaps become catchwords that suggest explaining everything in a similar fashion to 
how the localization of certain emotions and actions in brains used to explain things. 
Nevertheless, this shared understanding of ever-changing brains has opened up a promising 
way to combine culture and biology. Biocultural approaches to the emotions have recognized 
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that language and culture shape the neural connections in the brain and thus also our 
emotions – even genetically identical individual brains are never the same, let alone the 
brains of people from different cultures or historical eras.15 However, it is interesting to 
observe that neuroplasticity may come close to the definition of social constructivism (at least 
in its modest, non-relativist mode). Biology may thus even confirm what social scientists 
have thought concerning the nature of human experience for decades. Neuroplasticity, 
however, is not a constant. In particular, as people grow older, the capacity of the brain to 
adapt diminishes, although it never seems to cease completely.  
Of course, there is the study of neurohistory, or ‘deep history’, as formulated by 
Daniel Lord Smail, who traces the interplay between a changing human environment and the 
human body by utilizing neuroscientific, evolutionary and epigenetic hypotheses.16 As he 
states in his 2014 article, the approach of neurohistory  
begins with the principle that the human brain is relatively plastic and therefore 
continuously open to developmental and cultural influences. This does not 
mean that we should treat the brain as a blank slate. Instead, such influences, as 
they interact with given brain/body systems, can generate unpredictable 
forward-acting effects.17 
Reliable historical sources, as well as the rapidly changing hypotheses of the brain sciences, 
may prove to be a major problem in this enterprise. However, his endeavour points in the 
direction of understanding how history and the social and physical environment are ingrained 
in the human body and brain, and how, vice versa, the adaptive human body and brain shape 
the environment and culture in time.18 Moreover, Smail has introduced chemical and 
psychotropic explanations into the history of human experience, such as the effect of 
pollution, drugs, the Internet or rituals that generate neurotransmitter responses, bodily 
 7 
 
reactions and emotions. Alternating stress responses induced by social hierarchies form a key 
approach in Smail’s theorizing.19 
Yet the hypothetical nature of his work is highlighted, for instance, in the abstract of 
the aforementioned article on the application of neuroscience to the history of compulsive 
hoarding: ‘Using the coevolutionary approach intrinsic to environmental history, we can treat 
the rise of compulsive hoarding as an emergent phenomenon generated by the unpredictable 
ways in which cognitive and endocrinological systems have interacted with a changing 
material environment.’20 The article seems to suggest that an in-built capacity for hoarding 
may become a compulsion once humans are removed from ‘natural’ communities of scarcity.  
This all may sound plausible and interesting as such, but it remains unclear whether 
the description of the interaction between biological functions and the environment adds 
anything historically substantial to the interaction between changing humans and the 
changing environment supposed by social constructivism since the 1960s.21 Yet Smail’s 
approach not only frames but bypasses the constructivist view with neurally adaptive and 
biological primacy. Whereas cultural historians may treat hoarding as a feature of consumer 
and trash society or an inherited habit from the war generations, Smail goes further and 
supposes that the things hoarders gather are proxy serotonin stimulants. Low serotonin levels 
in the brain are associated with depression and low confidence, and modern consumerism is 
at the root of hoarders’ depression.22 In this way Smail tries to detect the interaction between 
the changing environment and bodies as biocultural entities. 
The ‘neuro turn’ reflects a rapprochement between the history of emotions and 
neurohistory.23 However, Smail’s overall approach is somewhat based on the assumption of 
universal basic emotions, a notion that has proved problematic both within and outside the 
history of emotions.24 While certain pan-human emotions such as anger and enjoyment may 
well be considered more transcultural and transhistorical than some others in their 
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physiology, sensory experience and even expression, it has nevertheless proved rather 
difficult to decipher which particular emotions are supposed to be universal and how they are 
supposed to be universally expressed or perceived.25  
The recent theoreticians of the history of emotions have vigorously defended the 
malleability of emotions over time and across cultures by rejecting the universalism of basic 
emotions proposed by proponents of biologism such as Paul Ekman.26 This is obviously an 
important epistemological question regarding what emotions are or may be. Even if one 
accepted the possibility of basic human emotions, however they are manifested, it would 
leave ample room for plasticity, nuance, historical change and ‘cogmotion’. In any case, the 
context and phenomenology of even the basic emotions of ‘natural kinds’ such as fear are 
crucial for the historian. What did people fear in any given time, why did they fear, and what 
consequences did their fear have?27 In the end, emotions are what emotions do. Or, as 
Boddice has put it, the history of emotions should not be history about preconceived 
emotions in context but a history of the nuances of past emotions that may reveal a degree of 
unfamiliarity, yet be understood in biocultural and embodied terms. This will also merge the 
history of the senses with an interpretation of embodied feelings. What we smell and feel is 
not there until we give temporal and affective meaning to it.28 
The historian of religion Robert C. Fuller has taken on a task as ambitious as Smail’s 
in telling the story of ‘religion in the flesh’, or how the human biological and neural make-up 
has made us inherently prone towards religion. Yet, obviously, there is no one deterministic 
path that leads people to express their spirituality, if at all.29 Clearly, problems similar to 
those in Smail’s enterprise exist in Fuller’s, although to a certain degree this is true in every 
theoretical adaptation in history, whether it is cognitive psychology or psychoanalysis. The 
past as history does not conform to universalizing tendencies, yet historians constantly apply 
conceptual thought and theoretical approaches in their research. Obviously, the natural 
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sciences can (seemingly, at least) claim universal adaptation, whereas modern psychological 
theories are certainly shaped by today’s society.  
The key is to make theoretical insights credible and applicable in the face of the past 
by historicizing them. This should mean avoiding a straightforward application of 
psychological or social-scientific theory to one’s empirical sources. Instead, a critical 
dialogue between theories and sources or data should enhance our insights into the past and 
add to our theoretical understanding.30 This bidirectional pathway to historical understanding 
may prove a challenge for the combination of brain sciences and history, though, because it 
crosses the line between ‘the two cultures’. Historians are usually not in a position to develop 
brain sciences, and the notion of brain plasticity does not in itself rewrite the history of 
emotions or other fields. However, historians may be able to converse with the social 
neurosciences and add to the understanding of cultural, social and temporal variation in 
human brain/body interaction with the environment. Furthermore, critical neurosciences may 
add to the understanding of how the social environment is constructed and embodied in 
practice. 
Some historians are surely tempted to dismiss the examples mentioned above as 
useless tautologies. Yes, human biology is an inescapable fact that sets certain limits to 
human experience that are, however, not easily determined. But if biology does not determine 
human culture, knowledge, emotions and actions, why bother researching it at all? Is it not 
more convenient to just leave it to biologists and brain scientists and to concentrate on what 
we know best, that is, historical change and its social constructivist underpinnings? 
However, as demonstrated, the human brain/body exists in history. In this regard, 
therefore, critical neurosciences need history. Furthermore, I argue that we cannot dismiss the 
brain sciences, because they do not dismiss culture (although as a presentist field of science 
they often dismiss history). Human experience and symbols do not reside purely out there in 
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the cultural web in Geertzian fashion; rather, they are embedded in our bodies and their 
neural networks. Nature and nurture are a two-way street, not a hardware and software 
application. I find the definition of culture as an always limited human enterprise to 
symbolize and share our inner feelings with other people to be a fruitful idea.31 Culture and 
human symbols do not reside outside or inside of us but rather in between us.  
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) may offer a useful insight into the bidirectional 
nature of both the brain sciences and culture. I do not evaluate the usefulness of PTSD 
diagnostics here; that is not my point. However, it is interesting to observe that it is 
impossible to draw a universal chart of symptoms of traumatic experiences that have resulted 
from otherwise comparable circumstances. There seems to be wide cultural and temporal 
variation in experiences labelled as ‘traumatic’. In the Finnish case, for instance, the shell-
shocked veterans of the Second World War often experienced their trauma as if they had 
been physically wounded, or even dismembered, although they had no visible physical 
wounds and had not lost any body parts. Somatic symptoms that imitated physical wounds 
were common elsewhere as well, especially in societies that did not accept the concept of 
individual psychological damage. In a way, being shell-shocked was a political statement.32  
At first, there seems to be little ground for claiming that war-related trauma or even 
modern PTSD is an entirely socially constructed phenomenon, that is, a product of bare 
culture. Trauma occurs when one is pushed to one’s limits and forced to experience 
something extraordinary. Yet no human has ever existed outside culture. There is cultural and 
personal variation in what is considered extraordinary. But one is usually able to find some 
shared symptoms across cultures and historical eras. In keeping with the biocultural framing 
this article has proposed, there have been evident continuities across time and place. In some 
studies Russian soldiers of the First and the Second World Wars have been reported as not 
having suffered from ‘Western’ traumas. Perhaps not, but that does not mean that they did 
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not suffer from anything. Psychological and individual trauma was not recognized in Russian 
society at the time, but at the same time desertion and self-inflicted wounds abounded in the 
ranks along with mutism, convulsions and fatigue – symptoms similar to those their fellow 
Western combatants experienced.33 Dualistic reasoning stressing bare biology or culture is 
not justified. Trauma may set a good example, showing that embracing neuroplasticity does 
not require us to focus on profound differences. 
However, it is more than clear that biology and genes do not determine human 
experience as such. Fear of air raids and shelling was obviously a non-existent feeling for 
early modern people. Yet the social, cultural and temporal variations have biological 
limitations; human responses to unimaginable events tend to produce similar, though not the 
same, outcomes. The critical neurosciences and brain plasticity could offer a middle ground 
to observe traumatic experiences in history. 
 
Towards an embodied understanding of emotions 
This article has suggested an epistemological shift towards a corporeal understanding of 
emotions and social constructivism. This leads theoretically towards understanding emotions 
as historically changing experiences and cognitive, intellectual concepts. These have, 
moreover, certain transcultural and recurring aspects. Inevitably, this epistemological shift 
brings the non-conscious back into the history of emotions. Interestingly, the differences 
between psychoanalysis and modern brain science are marked, but what these disciplines 
share is a challenge to the view that ‘consciousness is the master in its own house’.34 The self 
cannot be its own master, because many of the processes of the brain and nervous system 
occur non-cognitively, that is, outside of awareness. Yet, at the same time, neuroscientifically 
understood emotions are intellectual ‘thoughts’ and thus susceptible to navigation and 
cognitive change. Obviously, the acceptance of the neuroscientific view leads to an 
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intellectual problem that cannot be discussed here at length. In a nutshell, if one seeks to 
adopt a neuroscientific explanation of the ‘synaptic self’ that integrates culture and the 
physical environment, then one may be on a path to reductionism. For instance, although 
brain scientists are increasingly looking at human group behaviour, interaction and 
neurodiversity,35 how, in concrete terms, do brain sciences intervene in the history of 
collectively shared emotions or emotionally charged collective symbols? This concrete 
explanation remains to be seen. 
Although sympathetic towards the theoretical advances that brain sciences may offer, 
this article, at the same time, sees the methodological difficulties and dangers in the 
adaptation of ‘corporeal constructivism’, which need further exploration. Historians who are 
critical towards the adaptation of neurosciences in the history of emotions have pointed out 
that one of the greatest mistakes one can make is to pick up a fashionable theory of affective 
neurosciences and base one’s historical research on it. Within a few years, the theory will, in 
most cases, be debunked or have developed considerably further, whereas the lifespan of 
good historical scholarship is expected to be considerably longer.36 Moreover, history does 
not happen in a lab. Brain-scientific knowledge is produced in an artificial setting that differs 
from everyday experience – and many of the experiments are conducted on animals. The 
laboratory is devoid of much of the human meaning given to one’s being in the world.37 
Obviously, one cannot run brain scans on the people of the past, and even if one could, how 
could those data be implemented in historical research in a meaningful way? 
Last but not least, many a social scientist and historian alike has noted that the brain 
sciences (or their popularizations) make very strong social claims based on rather thin 
evidence. One of the examples is the ‘mirror neurons’ found in the mid-1990s in monkeys 
and in humans soon after. Mirroring was swiftly established thereafter as the underlying 
proof of human reciprocity in feeling and, indeed, in culture, language, religion and the entire 
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foundation of sociability in humans. That is, on the basis of rather vague evidence, this 
mirroring was offered as the foundation for everything. When a fellow human being or a 
monkey was seen performing a certain task, for instance hand actions raising food items to 
the mouth, the corresponding sensorimotor neurons of a passive person or monkey were 
firing at the same time, as if they were performing the task themselves, not merely watching 
it.38 These findings were, again, interesting as such; a reported proof of embodied 
intersubjectivity in humans and some apes. Hence, the mirror neurons further point towards 
an embodied and social theory of emotions. But a social historian and a historian of emotions 
should step in and point out the vast evidence of changes, nuances, capabilities and 
incapacities in human emotional reciprocity, past and present, that calls into question 
simplistic explanations that do not in fact explain anything about history, but instead merely 
try to establish the mechanism of reciprocities. For instance, humans may possess an in-built 
capacity for empathy, but the changing economies and politics of the nurturing and 
distribution of empathy, especially in large groups that are not based on face-to-face 
interaction, are historically relevant. 
 
Conclusion 
Indeed, it is not the task of an historian to concentrate on arguing which neuroscientific 
theory can explain emotions in the past, if any. What we can do, however, is concentrate on 
the question of how epistemological challenges posed by the brain sciences could be 
critically integrated into historical scholarship. Based on a number of recent appeals for 
integrating ‘biology’ into the history of emotions, this task seems unavoidable.  
The first step should be debunking the view of the brain sciences as representing only 
universality as opposed to culture and social constructivism. What is universal is cultural, and 
vice versa – we live in an embodied and cultured universe. While emotions change and 
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develop over time, there certainly are evolutionary and genetic continuities in human 
emotional experiences. These two aspects should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but they 
may be theoretically merged into a biocultural understanding of how emotions are created 
and experienced in the historical context and how they change. Some first steps have already 
been taken, as illustrated in this article. Historians of emotions do not need to submit to the 
biologism suggested by the evolutionary sciences, or even the initially reductionist basic-
emotion-driven neurohistory that since its launch a decade ago has admittedly matured to 
appreciate more the co-evolutionary merger of culture and nature. However, they may benefit 
from appreciating the neuroscientific understanding of why we experience emotions in 
certain contexts the way we tend to do.  
At the same time, it should be kept in mind that, at least for the history of emotions, 
the brain sciences primarily offer a tool for posing new questions. There may be a number of 
fields in the history of emotions that will do well without critical or social neurosciences, 
such as the study of the politics and rhetoric of emotions or emotional communities; that is, 
the shared emotional norms, values and expressive styles.39 In a nutshell, this article 
recommends caution towards the blind application of neuroscientific data or theory in 
historical research. However, theoretical insights from the socially oriented brain sciences are 
welcome as heuristic methods in researching the history of emotions in a biocultural context. 
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